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I. Introduction
The International Crisis Group’s (ICG) most recent report on the Somali 
Republic deals with developments in the Northern region (Somalil-
and). It narrates what the informed knew all along: (a) that peace has 
been restored in most of the North for the past decade while the rest 
of the country, particularly Mogadishu and the southern third, are 
mired in violence; (b) that some semblance of constitutional order and 
administrative structure is in place; (c) that most of the public refused 
to accept naked force as a political instrument to deal with political 
problems; and (d) that corruption is pervasive among the political 
elite. Conceptually, the ICG report is divided into three parts. First, it 
provides a brief review of Somali political history. Second, it sketches 
the evolution of the region since the collapse of the Somali government 
in 1991 and the declaration of the region’s breakaway status from the 
rest of the country. Finally, it focuses on three elections organized in the 
last three years, in order to buttress the claim that the region deserves 
to be recognized as a sovereign country. This information raises piv-
otal questions about the profile of the region as well as the fate of 
the Somali people. Together, these two points invite a timely, wide, 
and thoughtful debate among Somalis and others concerned. After 
serious cogitation upon the details of the document, we submit that 
the Report presents important points for the international community 
to come to the aid of the people of the region to consolidate their com-
munal achievements—particularly in the areas of stability, economic 
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advancement, and institution building. However, the Report fails to 
clinch the argument for international recognition of a new sovereign 
Somaliland state in the Horn of Africa. The rest of this critical assess-
ment elucidates this proposition.
At first blush, it is important to register that we were born in and 
are of the northern region of the Somali Republic. Self-consciously 
anguished by the current circumstances, we are, therefore, cognizant 
of the obligations incumbent upon us with regard to the promotion of 
the well-being of our communities, particularly Gabileh District. More-
over, as scholars, we have collectively dedicated 35 years to sympa-
thetically understand the inner workings of Somali society, discern the 
great challenges of the age, and proffer possible remedies. That spirit 
and sense of belonging move us. Our strategic thinking, however, is 
informed by the profundity and appropriateness of this Somali adage: 
“Si xeego ay xeego u noqoto ilkuhuna u nabad galaan” (roughly, Play fierce 
hockey yet protect the teeth!). Sadly, we are of the opinion that the ICG 
Report sketches a political history replete with errors, misinterpreta-
tion, and omissions, and bedeviled by an untenable characterization 
of entire communities (all too negative or positive). In addition, it ends 
with recommendations that the Report’s analysis does not sustain. 
Ours, then, is an exercise in ideational counterfoil to the Report. To be 
sure, there are numerous possibilities for contestation, but, given the 
preliminary nature of our contributions, we limit our engagement to 
the following six categories:3
•  History and Memory
•  Unification
•  Democracy, Leadership, and Politics of Corruption
•  Collaboration with Military Dictatorship/Clanist Sentiments
•  Declaration of Sovereignty
•  A Word on the Report’s Conclusion
We will end our position with alternative recommendations that at 
once enthusiastically accent the legitimate needs of the people of the 
region and preserve the promise of a civic future that Somalis of all 
regions could build together.
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II. On History and Memory
A. The histories of the Somali Republic and the region are complex, 
and, consequently, no brief document, and particularly one with a 
different focus, should be expected to do justice to it. Nonetheless, 
there are important historical benchmarks that are unavoidable in any 
serious discussion. For instance, the ICG Report barely touches on the 
effects of colonialism and the Ethiopian annexation of Somali-inhabited 
areas. The first can be indicted at three moments: (a) the destruction of 
Somali life and property during the twenty-year Dervish resistance;4 
(b) the disregard of strong pan-Somali sentiments during WWII and, 
later, in the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya; and (c) the 
deep social and economic deficit left behind by the British Protector-
ate.5 This last point is critical to underscoring the dearth of human 
capital, one that would disadvantage the North in the ensuing com-
petition for the highest posts on the morrow of postcolonial time. For 
Ethiopia, suffice it to register the old and still continuing marginaliza-
tion of Somali-inhabited areas and perpetual intentions to undermine 
any strong Somali national state.
B. The ICG Report makes a less than accurate and fleeting remark 
on the admittedly controversial but heroic and extremely ennobling 
legacy of Sayid Mohamed Abdille Hassan. Unlike colonial mischief of 
dividing the natives into friendlies and rebels, the Sayid, on the whole 
a prophetic poet unparalleled in the annals of Somali literary creativity 
and courage, is the patron saint of Somali nationalism (Soomalinimo).6
C. The Report never mentions the glorious work of the Somali Youth 
League (SYL), the only nationalist movement that had a presence in all 
Somali lands. Here, also, the Report misses the fact that regional pre-
independence parties in the North, such as the Somali National League 
(SNL), the National United Front (NUF), and the United Somali Party 
(USP), all subscribed to the first principle: the unification of British and 
Italian Somalilands.
D. The Report fails to call attention to the historical point that North-
ern Somalis were highly significant to the success of the SYL delega-
tions to the United Nations in New York—led by the late Abdillahi Issa 
and, later, by Abdirazak H. Hussein—where they pressed for indepen-
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dence. More specifically, Northern Somalis in Paris, London, and New 
York subsidized the expenses of the SYL nationalists.
III. On Unification
A. The Report insinuates that the North was cheated because the Union 
Act was not properly and legally consummated. In the language of the 
ICG document:
[T]he precipitate nature of the unions had also left a number of legal 
questions pending. The two acts of union approved by the respective 
legislatures differed somewhat and no single legal document actually 
bound the two territories. The new national assembly recognized the 
error and passed a new act of union in January 1961, retroactive to the 
moment of independence, but some observers have argued that since the 
two territories were legally united, the new Act remained without force 
in the north.7
It is important to identify that the observers quoted in the previous 
sentence were consultants hired in 1992 by the regional administra-
tion in Hargeisa.8 It is also noteworthy to contrast such a claim with 
what Paolo Contini, the chief legal advisor to the new Somali Republic, 
wrote in his book in 1969:
The decision to form a union was reached at a conference of North-
ern and Southern Somali leaders held in Mogadishu between April 16 
and 22, 1960. A joint communiqué issued at the end of the conference 
announced it had been agreed that the two territories would be united 
on July 1, 1960; the new Somali Republic would be unitary, democratic 
and parliamentary State; the legislative bodies of the two territories 
would be merged into a National Assembly which would be set up ‘in 
order to investigate and propose convenient solutions to the problems 
connected with the Administrative, financial and judicial systems now 
in force in the two Territories’; the United Nations would be asked ‘to 
supply experts who may help in accelerating the integration of the two 
Territories’… . On June 27, the day after independence, Somaliland’s leg-
islative Assembly passed ‘The Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law,’ 
incorporating the proposed Act of Union previously sent to Mogadishu. 
Section 1(a) stated that ‘The State of Somaliland and the State of Somalia 
do hereby unite and shall forever remain united in a new, independent, 
democratic, unitary republic the name of which shall be the SOMALI 
REPUBLIC. (Our highlighting.)
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Contini adds:
There is no doubt that on the first of July a full and lawful union was 
formed by the will of the people of the two territories through their 
elected representatives. However, the legal formalities had not been 
completed in time…the matter was clarified seven months later by the 
adoption of the new Act of Union with retroactive effect as from July 1, 
1960 for the whole of the Republic.9
The Union Act reads exactly as the Somaliland legislature wrote 
it. Another related matter the ICG Report misrepresents is how the 
constitution of the new Republic was developed. The fact is that Ital-
ian Somaliland, the United Nation’s Trusteeship, had an earlier start 
in constitution making than the British territory. Despite this, there 
were consultations between the leaders of the two regions, and United 
Nations experts assisted in the endeavor. The draft constitution was 
given to visiting Northern leaders to review and make changes as 
they saw fit. The Northerners liked the document and added only two 
articles (88 and 89). These additions dealt with public employees and 
mandated the creation of an independent public service commission, 
points incorporated into the document. The new parliament vetted the 
draft constitution, which triggered public debate, particularly after the 
document was read, article-by-article, over the two national broadcast-
ing stations Radio Hargeisa and Mogadishu. Then came the constitu-
tional plebiscite in 1961. Nearly three-fourths of the Republic’s voting 
population endorsed the constitution, with opposition limited to areas 
of the northern region centered on the Hargeisa, Burao, and Berbera 
triangle. This opposition accounted for nearly 52% of the northern 
region’s voting population, but areas west of Hargeisa and east of 
Burao overwhelmingly supported the constitution, and there was a 
significant minority of voters within the Hargeisa-Berbera-Burao coor-
dinates that cast an affirmative vote. The plebiscite marked the state’s 
commitment to democratic rule, as it did not attempt to gerrymander 
the Northern vote in order to manufacture artificial support for the 
charter in the North. This approach was reinforced by the impeccable 
way the parliamentary and local election of 1964 was conducted. Africa 
Report characterized the election as free and fair.10 Unfortunately, it 
would be the last election in which all contestants played by the rules.
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B. The ICG Report asserts that:
These problems were exacerbated by the perceived southern domination 
of the new government. Mogadishu became the national capital, while 
Hargeysa ‘declined to a mere provincial headquarters remote from the 
centre of things.’ Somaliland, now known as the ‘Northern Regions,’ 
received just 33 seats in the new 123-member national assembly. The 
posts of President and Prime Minister were both held by southerners, 
as were the principal ministerial portfolios such as Defense, Foreign 
Affairs, Finance and Interior. The command of the new national army 
was overwhelmingly drawn…from the south.11
It is the case that Hargeisa initially became the regional capital of the 
North and, later, the headquarters of the northwest as the government 
honored a request from the people of Burao for their own regional 
authority. Further, it is accurate that the President, Prime Minister, and 
the most senior military officers of the Republic were from the South 
(the Minister of Defense was a Northerner, contrary to the claim of the 
ICG report—first Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, then Sh. Ali Ismail).
The Report tells part of the story that is amenable to the claims 
of its authors, but a more comprehensive look at the facts conveys a 
different picture. For instance, when President Aden Abdulle Osman 
was nominated for the interim period of one year, no other candidate 
came forward to challenge him. However, this changed when Osman 
ran for a full term the following year. Surprisingly, the only other can-
didate, who was narrowly defeated, was from the South as well. When 
Egal, the leading Northern politician, was asked to seek the office, he 
declined. Further, we think Northern political leaders could have made 
the case to increase the region’s parliamentary deputies to constitute at 
least one-third of the total, due to the estimated population size of the 
area. The intervention was not made12 and, subsequently, a golden 
opportunity was missed. On the ministerial appointments, Northern-
ers occupied four of the thirteen posts. The key ones included the 
post of Deputy Prime Minister, Defense, Education, and Agriculture. 
Further, the Speaker of Parliament was also from the North. Moreover, 
what is unsaid in the ICG Report is that many of the paramount heads 
of ministries (top civil servants) were from the North. These included 
Finance, Education, Agriculture, Interior, and Commerce and Industry. 
Northerners also headed two pivotal agencies, the National Trading 
Agency and the National Relief Agency. Such was the general distribu-
tion of senior political and administrative posts of the first Republic. 
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One of the North’s most senior civil servants noted that, “Prime Minis-
ter Abdirashid and leading ministers consulted senior Northern public 
servants on key matters, particularly on those that dealt with integra-
tion.”13
IV. Democracy, Leadership, and Politics of Corruption
A crucial dimension of what haunts Somalis is the quality of leader-
ship and respect for the law. There is no doubt today that the Somali 
Republic’s first President, Aden Abdulle Osman, and his second Prime 
Minister, Abdirazak H. Hussein, were genuine leaders by any demo-
cratic measure. As one of the North’s most skilled and senior former 
civil servants, Ali Said Arraleh, observed recently:
Aden was so strict with the taxpayers’ money that he saved enough from 
the presidency annual budget to build a presidential retreat in Afgoi, 
while others were pocketing public money. For instance Prime Minister 
Egal used public revenue to build his private villa (Villa Baidoa) on the 
road to Afgoi. Prime Minister Abdirazak’s respect for the law and his 
anti-corruption effort has no parallel in our history. His hands are abso-
lutely untainted and the two are peerless as Somali leaders.14
This characterization of the two leaders is reaffirmed by the words 
of the Somali Republic’s most independent journalist, Yusuf Duhul, 
who happened to be from the North. Duhul’s monthly, Dalka, was sin-
gularly the most prestigious paper of the time and with a critical edge 
to boot. He had the following to say about the caliber of these leaders 
and the political rectitude and rules that governed their conduct:
One thing is indisputably certain. It had never even occurred to the 
Aden/Abdirazak team to look into the possibilities of applying the norms 
of Somali tribalism to the state, or its institutions and functions. One rea-
son for such disregard of any such thought is that the applying of tribal 
norms and criteria to the state and its institutions would have been then 
a flagrant violation of the Somali constitution… . Paradoxically, the prin-
cipal targets of the Dalka’s verbal violence were the governmental team of 
the first president of the Somali Republic, Aden Abdulle Osman, and his 
choice of Prime Minister, Abdirazak Haj Hussein—whose government is 
now accepted by all to have been the best Somalis ever had. Dalka itself 
was not oblivious, even then, of that fact. Stating it openly, however, 
would have been seen as despicable and venal… . Dalka then noted…the 
Bildhaan  Vol. 5
114
basic distinguishing feature of the…team was the fundamental factor 
underlying the political framework…consensual… . One of the results 
of such consensual approach was the removal of the need to resort to 
political violence. Hence, neither the government nor its opponents con-
sidered intimidation as an instrument to use in the political arena… . 
The advantage of this system of mutual tolerance…included…freedom 
from physical intimidation and from the resulting worry about their 
personal safety. Consequently, one of the common sights [in Mogadishu] 
of the period was to see Prime Minister Abdirazak Haj Hussein sitting in 
Juba hotel, sipping a cup of tea while dueling verbally with the critics of 
his government. He would, at the end, calmly walk, usually alone, to his 
house, situated a few hundred metres up the hill to the then Monopolio. 
An equally familiar sight of the period was to find the President of the 
Republic, Aden Abdulle Osman, performing his Maqreb prayers, beside 
his small Fiat, alone or with an ad hoc prayer gathering on the road side. 
There just were no reasons then for either of them to worry about his 
personal safety.15
The maturity of these democratic leaders and their resolute respect 
for the law and the sanctity of public resources led to the Somali Repub-
lic experiencing Africa’s first democratic change of regime, in 1967. 
The next democratic transfer of postcolonial power in the continent 
would have to wait for 25 years (1992) and take place in Zambia! More 
relevant, it was such practice, the heart and soul of the system, that 
allowed Mohamed Ibrahim Egal to claim the Republic’s executive 
premiership. There is no doubt in our minds that a historic experience 
of this type could happen again if peace and democracy were restored 
to the whole country. From our viewpoint, this is exactly what the 
international community needs to encourage, rather than reinforce 
sectarian political tendencies.
There were further changes during the tenure of the second republic 
(1964–67). The verdict overwhelmingly supports Duhul’s assessment 
that the government of this period was the best the country had had 
since independence. Northerners held five important ministerial port-
folios: Foreign Affairs, Defense, Finance, Agriculture, and Information. 
Moreover, Northerners took up nine of the top civil service posts in the 
country (out of sixteen). These developments demonstrate that the new 
Republic’s leaders, despite their limited education and political/admin-
istrative experience, were very serious about genuine integration. The 
implied Southern monopoly of privilege is simply fiction.
Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar
115
One of the best examples of Somali democrats working for the col-
lective interest of the entire nation (that debunks the conspiracy theory) 
pertains to the formation of the national air carrier, Somali Airlines. Its 
full story is yet to be told, but here is a snapshot of how it was estab-
lished. We borrow, verbatim, from our essay in Bildhaan:
[Abdirashid, the Prime Minister, and Abdirazak, minister of public 
works] approached the U.S. Ambassador and informed him of the coun-
try’s immense communication and transport problems…The two lead-
ers specifically requested that the American government assist them in 
developing air transport. The Ambassador relayed the request to Wash-
ington and returned with a positive answer for the Somalis. The Ameri-
can offer was three completely reconditioned Dakota Planes, each with 
a capacity of 26 seats. Satisfied with the response, the PM delegated 
Abdirazak and the Ambassador to finalize the agreement. Soon came 
up the training of the pilots and ground crew for the incipient venture. 
The Ambassador indicated that the United States could not help in this 
regard. On his own initiative, Abdirazak approached the West German 
Ambassador (who had already given generous logistical support to the 
Somali Police Force), and requested that West Germany assist Somalia 
by training Somali pilots and ground crew. The Germans reacted affir-
matively within a week, with the only condition that Germans set up the 
training program. The first key provisions of the agreement were that 
the trainees be instructed in English and, therefore, must have a second-
ary school certificate. Second, the Germans would conduct the examina-
tion to select the trainees.
The Ministry immediately advertised 28 openings (for pilots, mechan-
ics, assistants, and other ground crew) on the national radio and in 
the daily papers. Once the language conditions for the trainees became 
public knowledge, many Southern political heavy-weights criticized the 
regime, and particularly Abdirazak, for favoring the North. He had audi-
ences with them and tried to persuade them that the Germans mandated 
the examination’s English requirement, and that he could not go against 
this if the country was to make progress in civil aviation. Moreover, he 
challenged them that there were Southerners who had studied English in 
the Egyptian Secondary School and other places and who should be able 
to compete for the posts. He warned that regional or family favoritism 
had no place in the regime’s agenda, and national advancement would 
only take place when every citizen was given an equal opportunity. This 
was not sufficient to convince the Southern regionalists.
The Germans conducted the examination as planned, and, as it turned 
out, all but two of the successful candidates were from the North; the 
two Southerners were selected for the ground crew. As the entire class 
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flew to Germany to commence their studies, Abdirazak called in North-
ern critics to take note of the merit-based competitive process for the 
selection of the pilots—evidence that should fly in the face of sectarian 
rumors. He pointed out that had he been a regionalist, he would have 
automatically approached the Italian Government to assist in aviation 
development, a request that would have been met with enthusiasm. This 
would have disqualified all potential Northern candidates. Although 
some of the Northern critics recognized the fairness of the pilot selection 
process, the general public, now marooned in gossip and seduced by 
instrumentalist politicians, did not care enough to appreciate the import 
of the event.16
Another affair that was a testimony to democratic practice, the 
application of traditional consensus, and the rule of law at work in the 
Somali Republic was the way in which the government dealt with the 
foiled coup of 1961. Again, we lift from our essay in Bildhaan:
Several months after the new regime took charge of the nation’s affairs, 
a small group of young Northern military officers attempted a coup in 
Hargeisa. This move surprised everyone including Egal who was the 
Minister of Defense, and Sh. Ali Ismail, another Northerner who was 
appointed to the post recently. The principal claim of the young officers, 
some who were trained in Britain, was that poorly educated officers 
from the South had been undeservedly given most command appoint-
ments. The initiators of the coup alleged they had the blessings of the 
country’s military commander, General Daud A. Hersi. To say the least, 
this event shocked the regime, and General Hersi instantly denied the 
accusation over Radio Mogadishu. Northern non-commissioned officers 
immediately reacted to the General’s announcement and moved against 
the coup instigator; the loyalists recaptured Radio Hargeisa and killed 
one of the coup makers. The Interior and Defense Ministers, the lat-
ter being Sh. Ali Ismail, immediately flew to Hargeisa. At the regional 
military command, they congratulated the loyalists and then convened 
a public meeting in the afternoon in which Sh. Ali Ismail made a mov-
ing speech. He castigated the fomenters of the coup and opposition in 
the North, but went too far by suggesting that the coup makers might 
be hanged. While some of the public seemed unhappy with what they 
considered a regime dominated by the “Majeerteen Abdis” (Abdirashid 
and Abdirazak), there was no sign that they supported the coup. Abdi-
razak spoke in a reconciliatory tone and told the gathered public that 
something unfortunate had happened, including the loss of an educated 
Somali, and it should be a warning to the entire nation. The two minis-
ters returned and produced a report. This was in December 1961.
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Many Northerners sought forgiveness for the plotters. A few went 
to the President to seek his intervention, but Aden responded that 
what they were asking him to do was not within his legal authority. 
Others approached the Prime Minister for clemency, while a few 
respected Northerners, such as Haji Basbaas, asked the Minister of Inte-
rior’s good offices in the matter. In the end, the regime decided that 
it did not want to set a precedent for the extralegal treatment of the 
case, and, therefore, started making preparations for a trial. Northerners 
accepted the proposition that the case could be heard in a civil rather 
than a military court, and that non-Somali and British trained lawyers 
be found to defend the accused. The regime initially rejected the need 
for foreign lawyers, but the President persuaded his colleagues to honor 
this request as well. The Prime Minister was conciliatory and did not 
want the physical elimination of the accused, but Sh. Ali Ismail and a 
few other Northerners felt strongly that coup plotters should be treated 
swiftly and harshly. The final accord between the state prosecutors and 
the two British lawyers stipulated that the court procedure would be 
that of the North (Indian) but the substance of the law would be South-
ern (Italian).
Soon the funds collected by the immediate families and supporters of 
the accused proved insufficient to pay for the British lawyers. The state 
decided to cover the balance. As the case went forward, the criminal 
facts against the accused seemed immutable. However, the public pros-
ecutor made a minor procedural error and the British judge quickly dis-
missed the entire case on technical grounds. There were celebrations in 
Hargeisa, but other Somalis felt that the judge was biased. In the ensuing 
cabinet meeting to discuss options, the Minister of Defense was among 
the angriest over the decision. With the recognition that the regime had 
the right to appeal the case, the Prime Minister consulted with the Presi-
dent and the two decided that the state should drop the case. Limiting 
its reactions to condemnation of the Judgment, the regime expelled the 
judge from the country, and the coup instigators regained their freedom 
and soon thereafter positions in the civil service. This was the first 
time (and may be the last) in Africa’s post independence that a sitting 
regime released coup makers without any retribution.17 (Our highlight-
ing.)
Finally, the last democratic regime, 1967–1969, was led by none other 
than Mohamed Ibrahim Egal. If ever there was a need for definitive 
evidence to verify that the Somali democratic political order was open 
and competitive, the rise of Egal to the top executive post in the coun-
try clearly provides this. In addition, Northerners had three ministerial 
portfolios in Egal’s government.
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Corruption was not unknown among the Somali political elite, and 
the military dictatorship made it a code of conduct in the last decade 
of its life-span. However, there is enough evidence to show that the 
1967–69 regime, particularly in the persons of Prime Minister Egal and 
the Minister of Interior, Yassin Nur Hassan, set new standards for loot-
ing the national treasury. Moreover, the ICG Report itself makes clear 
reference to how Egal’s propensity toward personal appropriation of 
public resources became part of the conduct of his leadership and 
legacy for the Northern region.
V. Declaration of Sovereignty
A. The breakup of a political community is not unheard of. On the 
contrary, there are moments when such an option is the most appro-
priate step to take. However, because it is such a drastic departure, it 
is imperative that those who promote/support this option are fastidi-
ously deliberative, inclusive, and have a wakeful eye for the long-term 
consequences. The Report underscores the peculiar circumstances and 
ways in which the initial declaration of sovereignty of the new Somalil-
and Republic was made at the Burao meeting (p. 9). It is now common 
knowledge that intimidation, beefed up by armed Somali National 
Movement (SNM) fighters, was the declaration’s midwife. The ques-
tion arises, then, as to why the Report did not follow up this point and, 
therefore, opine the obvious illegitimacy of the act.
B. Another source of difficulty is the preparation and operation of both 
the 2001 constitutional referendum and the 2003 presidential election. 
In the first case, the Report says very little about the undue hurry with 
which these affairs were conducted and the fact that some important 
parts of the region did not vote at all. Second, the Report is oblivi-
ous to the contradiction between democratic politics and the absence 
of space for constructive dissidence on such a fateful issue. Here, we 
would like to note the brief incarceration in Hargesia, and subsequent 
deportation, of one of the region’s most prominent citizens, General 
Jama Mohamed Qalib, solely for participating in the Somali Peace Con-
ference in Kenya. As for the presidential election, it is ironic that, while 
the Report identifies gross procedural violations, including an instru-
mentalist remaking of the composition of the Supreme Court, it fails to 
follow that indictment to its logical conclusion—that is, remark on the 
magnitude of the damage to the democratic process reminiscent of the 
Abdirashid/Egal-led Somali elections of 1969.
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VI. On Collaboration with Military Dictatorship 
and Clanist Sentiments
A. A discernment of who collaborated with the military dictatorship 
and to what degree will be an important point of historical research 
and reflective conversation among Somalis for some time to come. The 
ICG document enters that fray by identifying two Northern communi-
ties as willing allies of the regime: the Dir (Samaroon and Isse) and the 
Harti (pp. 11, 28). Simultaneously, the Isaaq kin-group is presented as 
innocent sufferers. This is problematic. To begin with, all Northern 
communities had representatives in the Supreme Revolutionary Coun-
cil (SRC) and the Council of Secretaries. Consequently, the Isaaq had 
their share and maybe more, as the following, nonexhaustive list of 
examples confirms: Vice President Colonel Ismail Ali Aboker, Colonel 
Ahmed Hassan, Foreign Minister Omer Arteh Qalib, and Planning 
Minister Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo. Moreover, Egal himself, after fin-
ishing his internment, accepted an ambassadorial appointment to India 
and later became head of the Chamber of Commerce in Mogadishu. 
Most instructively, individuals of the Isaaq kin-group remained loyal 
to the Barre regime to its dying days. Here, it is well to remember that 
Mohamed Hawadleh Madar, the last Prime Minister in 1990, threat-
ened the denizens of Mogadishu with a ruin similar to the one meted 
out to Burao and Hargeisa if they did not capitulate. Moreover, Omer 
Arteh became premier of Ali Mahadi’s short-lived pretension. On the 
other hand, the windfall for the Samaroon and Isse and significant ele-
ments of the northern Harti was comparatively miniscule.
B. The Report fails to offer concrete evidence for selectively maligning 
some communities while exalting others. We argue that this history 
could be told differently. Our thinking, distilled from our extensive 
scholarly research and reading of Somali social history and political 
economy, is that the military dictatorship of 1969–91 was ruinous in the 
last fifteen years of its tenure and insensately destroyed individuals 
and communities across the country. The Northeast region (Puntland) 
was the first to bear the brunt of the regime’s cruelty. However, the 
Northwest region (Somaliland), particularly the cities of Hargeisa and 
Burao, witnessed the greatest horror. In addition, during the entire 
period of its rule, the regime exploited the farming communities of the 
South, while many others lost their livelihoods. Understandably, the 
Somali public expected a second independence (Goobanimo) with the 
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demise of the dictatorship, but they were rudely surprised by the hor-
rible turn of events. The population of the capital was the first to wit-
ness incomprehensible and large-scale killings and the expropriation of 
private and public property during the last days of Siyaad’s order and 
immediately thereafter. The main culprits of this gruesome affair were 
a mixture of organized clanistic and freelance militias. As the country 
sank deeper into mayhem, the productive people of the Baidoa region, 
in the South, starved to death by the tens of thousands as a result of 
armed bandits’ use of food as a weapon. It was the ghastly pictures of 
the victims that compelled former President George H. Bush to send 
American troops to save lives. The moral of this synoptic history is 
this: There is no place for privileged pain.
C. The Report neglects to expose the Somali National Movement’s 
(SNM) ensnaring paradox—one it shared with other armed opposi-
tion groups—that at once mobilized its adherents through exclusive 
clanist appeal while publicly speaking the rhetoric of civic nationalism. 
Though one could rightly criticize the non-Isaaq in the North for not 
joining the resistance against the dictatorship, this Janus-faced iden-
tity of the SNM was a serious disincentive. Furthermore, the Report’s 
interpretation of some events contains a number of statements that 
seem, even if unintended, to foment suspicion between the eastern and 
western communities in the North (pp. 28, 30). In this context, suffice 
to recall the clairvoyant warnings of one of the most distinguished 
poets in modern Somali history, Abdillahi Sultan “Timacadde:” “Dugsi 
male qabyaaladii waxeey dumiso mooyaane” (Clanism provides no succor; 
it only destroys!).
We end this segment with a brief but important comment on the 
poverty of the theoretical apparatus of the Report. It is hobbled by the 
greatest debility of an old paradigm of Somali Studies—that is, the 
attempt to explain almost everything in Somali life through a constant 
and single variable, the clan. Such a simplistic perspective,18 we have 
demonstrated in our works and in a British Tribunal,19 is incapable 
of depicting change and complex social mutations, let alone explicate 
them.
VII. Conclusions and Recommendations of the ICG Report
1. The ICG Report postulates that a productive reconciliation between 
the North and South is a nonstarter. This is based on what the Report 
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construes to be the existence of a “mutually exclusive precondition 
for dialogue;” and an “incompatible perspective on possible forms of 
association and divergent paths of development.” We disagree, and 
the fuller articulation will be part of a forthcoming volume.20 For now, 
we think a central concern of most Somalis in every region is this: How 
to imagine a civic unity and establish the correlate forms of democratic 
and human rights-based institutions, rather than exclusivist claims 
that could only be satisfied through further balkanization. The senti-
ment, it seems to us, exists for admittedly hard yet productive and 
recuperative national conversation.
2. Possible forms of association need not be limited to a preconceived 
“bilateral confederation.” We have no knowledge of any evidence to 
the effect that all people of the North have already agreed that “con-
federation” is the only form of association acceptable to them.
3. The claim that Somaliland has “laid the foundations of constitutional 
democracy” has some validity but it obscures this fact and a clinging 
possibility: the people of the South have already proven that they, too, 
can create an inclusive democratic order. Here, we recall the enviable 
traditions and practice of the first three Republics. The fact that the 
Southern Somali people are hostages to armed political pirates, for the 
moment, in no way forecloses their contribution to a national demo-
cratic future.
4. The Report asserts that a “new generation of Somalilanders” had 
already emerged which has “no meaningful memories of peaceful, 
united Somalia.” While this could be the case given the duration of 
national statelessness and divisive scheming, we hasten to add that 
this generation is not necessarily burdened by the brutality of the now 
extinct dictatorship nor are they incapable of rediscovering, if not envi-
sioning anew, a republican and united Somali state. However, we iden-
tify two poisonous impediments to dreaming and acting on what could 
be: a deliberate inculcation of general hatred and chauvinistic “other-
ing” and/or the absolute triumph of brigandish politics in the South.
5. The Report states that if Somaliland is ostensibly forced into being 
a part of the territorial integrity of the Somali Republic, then “the 
result could be the reopening of the Somali civil war.” We concur that 
no community should comply with forced political demands. How-
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ever, we believe there is neither the capacity nor the wish by anyone 
to invade the region. Consequently, we hold that this assertion is an 
alarmist tactic to bamboozle the international community to hastily 
endorse the main recommendation of the Report, i.e., the recognition 
of the North as a sovereign state.
VIII. Alternative Counsel for Northern Somalis
•  Full disarmament. This will mean the persuasion of all the communi-
ties of the region to fully disarm at the household level by hand-
ing over guns of any kind. The open secret that most family units 
have small weapons is a ticking time bomb. Such a new move is an 
essential prerequisite for the elimination of the culture of fear and, 
consequently, a further flourishing of mutual trust, free discussion, 
and debate.
•  Deepening Democracy. Whether at the regional level or the hamlet, 
democratic habits and their institutionalization are indispensable for 
virtuous civic existence. In addition to strengthening the legal rights 
of each citizen and community, freedom of the press and association 
are a sine qua non for an accountable power.21 Here, particularly, dis-
sent politics must not only be tolerated but treated as an indispens-
able witness to the exercise of authority, if not a vector of unpopular 
but possibly corrective suggestions or, better still, contemplative of 
hidden, even unutterable, ideas of constructive ramifications. Such 
is the mark of a strong and mature democracy.22
•  Leadership. Without the availability of an educated talent fit for the 
vagaries of these complex times and the collective wisdom to iden-
tify and thrust it forward, any community is bound to wallow in the 
muck of mediocrity. This is a condition conducive to myopic poli-
tics, the reign of incompetence, and quick decay, if not stillbirth, of 
institutions. Northern Somalis have a historic opportunity to bring 
forth the type of leaders who have a combination of critical intel-
ligence, ability and valor to simultaneously concentrate on devel-
opmental strategies that address the life-enhancing indices of the 
people of the region and act as their broader brothers’/sisters’ 
keepers. The first task implies the challenge to build on the achieve-
ments of the region so as to make it into an even more inspiring 
model for the rest of the country; the second connotes abstinence 
from retail politics and, instead, the cultivation of national generosity 
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and solidarity with other Somalis, particularly in hard times, includ-
ing assuming leadership of the whole country. Who can foretell that 
the situation might not be in reverse sometime in the future?
IX. Counsel for the International Community
•  Development Assistance: There is no denying that Northern Somalis 
deserve to be supported in their laudable efforts to respond to the 
pervasive poverty and brittleness of their existence. Workable ideas, 
appropriate technical expertise, and generous aid to upgrade local 
initiatives are some of the contributions the outside world ought 
to make. More than any other region in the Somali Republic, the 
people of the North have made the most vigorous progress to earn 
sympathetic and concrete international attention. That much is true 
and the ICG document rightly conveys it. But, and this is of utmost 
importance, such a warranted partnership need not lead to the rec-
ognition of a sovereign state. For, crossing such a rubicon could 
easily entice lumpen elites in other regions of the country to demand 
the same. Moreover, a dismemberment of the Somali Republic will 
not necessarily bring peace and progress but, on the contrary, would 
probably create the momentum for the break-up of other states in 
the Horn of Africa (see the Oromo and other liberation movements 
in Ethiopia). It is worth remembering that the continent’s enor-
mous potential is already vitiated by, among others, the existence 
of, albeit juridical, numerous hapless states.
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